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T ESLIE Griffin proposes that religious attorneys can in fact rely
L-iupon their theological beliefs to determine appropriate legal pro-
fessional behavior.' She argues that the use of moral philosophy as a
discipline by which one can determine what is ethically appropriate in
legal practice is no different from using a theological or religious ap-
proach.2 Consequently, to the extent moral philosophy is relevant for
a discussion of legal ethics, so too is religion. Creating dichotomies
between religious studies and theology, and the old "standard concep-
tion"3 and a "new standard conception"4 of legal ethics, Professor
Griffin argues that religious beliefs can play a role in legal ethics simi-
lar to that of moral philosophy.
In this response, I address whether or how a religious attorney can
negotiate his or her professional conduct in a manner consistent with
his or her religious beliefs. I forgo, however, the dichotomies es-
poused by Professor Griffin and focus on the epistemological nature
of both law and religion. Like religion, the existence of the legal sys-
tem is premised upon certain ideas whose ultimate justification is little
more than belief. Adherence to a secular law that is respectful of plu-
ralism relies on certain conceptions of the person and of society which
* B.A., U.C. Berkeley; J.D., UCLA School of Law; currently a doctoral candi-
date in history at the University of Texas at Austin specializing in medieval Islamic
history and jurisprudence. I would like to thank Professor Khaled Abou El Fadl
whose insights on legal ethics and Islamic law were extremely helpful, and whose
article, Muslim Minorities and Self-Restraint in Liberal Democracies, 29 Loy. LA. L
Rev. 1525 (1996), provided a conceptual framework for this paper. I am also grateful
to Shahed Amanullah, William Kwong, Esq., and my wife, Naheed, for debating frus-
trating hypotheticals with me and reviewing earlier drafts. I would also like to thank
my wife for the encouragement and support which made this paper possible.
1. Leslie Griffin, The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work Legal Ethics, 66
Fordham L. Rev. 1253 (1998).
2. Professor Griffin differentiates between theological and religious approaches.
Griffin, supra note 1, at 1253. This distinction will be addressed later. See infra notes
32-36 and accompanying text.
3. According to David Luban, the "standard conception" of the lawyer's role
consists of "(1) a role obligation... that identifies professionalism with extreme parti-
san zeal on behalf of the client and (2) the 'principle of nonaccountability,' which
insists that the lawyer bears no moral responsibility for the client's goals or the means
used to attain them." David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study xx (1988);
see also Griffin, supra note 1, at 1254 and accompanying text (discussing David
Luban's "standard conception").
4. Professor Griffin offers the "new standard conception" as a means to distin-
guish between two methods of legal ethics. The first, or old "standard conception,"
relies on legal ethical codes to inform proper attorney behavior. The second, the
"new standard, philosophical view," introduces the use of moral philosophy into the
inquiry of legal ethics. See Griffin, supra note 1, at 1254.
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can only be justified in terms of conviction. Professor Griffin's argu-
ment incorporates this nature of the law by relying on John Rawls's
idea of "public reason."5 I will show that if we adopt Rawls's "polit-
ical liberalism" and "public reason," we immediately commit our-
selves to a system of "belief' in which the law is an instrumental
mechanism of stability and order. The law, with its legislative acts,
common law decisions, and even legal ethical codes, constitutes the
"dogma" and language of our "faith" as attorneys and citizens in a
political liberalist society. Consequently, to argue that religious belief
can play a role in legal decision-making in a political liberalist society
essentially requires a reciprocal interaction between two "belief" sys-
tems on the "truth" value of a particular act or series of acts. Whether
religion can be a part of an attorney's legal practice requires a negotia-
tion6 between two convictional systems, namely his professional ethics
and his religion, which are of equal moral value for the religious
attorney.
In Political Liberalism,7 Rawls is concerned with how a society can
maintain stability and order when its citizens adopt different and often
divergent "comprehensive doctrines" of good and truth. In other
words, "[H]ow is a just and free society possible under conditions of
deep doctrinal conflict with no prospect of resolution?"' Rawls's solu-
tion is to construct a political framework which does not address or
judge the moral value of the views held by its citizenry. His society is
a dualistic society which relegates matters of moral epistemology to
the realm of private life, while placing matters of social and political
organization in the realm of public life. Because Rawls's model of
political and social organization-"political liberalism"-does not in-
volve matters of morality, but rather is meant to allow different con-
ceptions of morality to exist, "justice" becomes a political concept for
Rawls that only addresses the most fundamental constitutional ques-
tions. Justice9 involves pragmatic and practical issues of social organi-
zation and control rather than questions of truth and meaning.
5. Id. at 1263 n.23.
6. My use of "negotiation" goes beyond Professor Griffin's use of "translate." Id.
at 1263. "Negotiation" connotes a reciprocal interaction between two equally valid
and equally prioritized systems of thought, whereas Professor Griffin's "translate"
seems to require only a one-way interaction where religious belief transforms itself
into language familiar to that of law and "political liberalism." As I will argue, Pro-
fessor Griffin's argument only reaffirms the public-private distinction which relegates
religion outside the realm of public discourse (and therefore legal ethics), and seems
to place her in the position from which she originally started.
7. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (1996).
8. Id. at xxx.
9. For Rawls, justice is principally a political idea whose primary function is to
order and organize society. As an organizing tool, justice is not meant to have meta-
physical import. Rather, it is a political conception which strives for fairness in soci-
ety. "[J]ustice as fairness starts from within a certain political tradition and takes as
its fundamental idea that of society as a fair system of cooperation over time, from
one generation to the next." Id. at 14 (footnote omitted).
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[T]he comprehensive philosophical and moral views we are wont to
use in debating fundamental political issues should give way in pub-
lic life. Public reason-citizens' reasoning in the public forum about
constitutional essentials and basic questions of justice-is now best
guided by a political conception the principles and values of which
all citizens can endorse. That political conception is to be, so to
speak, political and not metaphysical."
"Political liberalism" and its companion concept "justice as fairness"
exclude many issues of what a conception of justice held by a compre-
hensive doctrine such as moral philosophy or a religious tradition
should include.
By narrowing the scope of questions and issues that "political liber-
alism's" conception of justice can address, Rawls not only allows for a
pluralism of ideals and doctrines to exist, but he also attempts to insu-
late political discourse from any metaphysical tendency. At the begin-
ning of Political Liberalism, Rawls argues that his idea of a "well-
ordered society" in A Theory of Justice was "unrealistic."'" It was un-
realistic because the theory of justice he proffered in A Theory of Jus-
tice regarded justice itself as a "comprehensive doctrine."' 2 His new
idea of "political liberalism" is meant to avoid the criticism that it is a
comprehensive or metaphysical doctrine. "Political liberalism" is sup-
posed to be a "freestanding" conception of justice and public order
which does not incorporate any "specific metaphysical or epistemo-
logical doctrine beyond what is implied by the political conception it-
self."' 3 By making "justice" political in nature, Rawls hopes to
remove the metaphysical factors that plagued his earlier theory. 4
And yet, as suggested above, "political liberalism" cannot escape
the need for a metaphysical base that incorporates certain principles
of social organization and political stability which make it possible for
a pluralist society to exist and succeed."5 One of those principles is
Rawls's dualistic society itself, which distinguishes between a public
10. Id. at 10 (emphasis added) (internal cross-reference omitted).
11. Id. at xviii.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 10; see also Michael J. Sandel, Political Liberalism, 107 Harv. L Rev.
1765, 1771 (1994) (book review) (summarizing Rawls's argument that his concept of
political liberalism is political and not metaphysical or philosophical).
14. Sandel's review is a good source on the debates surrounding Rawls's Political
Liberalism. In particular, Sandel mentions how a central debate regarding Rawls's
theory "is not whether rights should be respected, but whether rights can be identified
and justified in a way that does not presuppose any particular conception of the
good." Sandel, supra note 13, at 1767.
15. Rawls admits that political liberalism includes epistemological aspects. See
Rawls, supra note 7, at 62. He argues, however, that these aspects are secondary
effects of a larger system of political organization whose primary task is to establish a
pragmatic system of governance. The thesis of this paper is that despite Rawls's ef-
forts to create a pragmatic system of organization, he cannot avoid using certain prin-
ciples of organization which serve as underlying principles that make the entire
venture possible. Although intended as incidental circumstances, the epistemological
1998] 1285
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and private realm of discourse. Although Rawls's dualistic society is
the foundation of his theory of political liberalism, the dualistic society
is also the basis of "political liberalism's" metaphysical nature. Essen-
tially, Rawls leaves "aside how people's comprehensive doctrines con-
nect with the content of the political conception of justice and regard
that content as arising from the various fundamental ideas drawn from
the public political culture of a democratic society." 6 What Rawls
does not admit, however, is that this conception of social and political
organization presupposes that other comprehensive doctrines can rel-
egate matters of politics outside the realm of morality and can adopt
the underlying principle of "political liberalism," either as a shared
understanding of humanity and social organization, or simply as a
political matter outside their scope of application.' 7 Rawls's concep-
tion does not respect comprehensive doctrines, which cannot make
this type of split. Because of this presupposition, "political liberalism"
itself becomes a comprehensive doctrine which distinguishes between
nature of these principles renders "political liberalism" vulnerable to being consid-
ered a comprehensive doctrine.
16. Id. at 25 n.27.
17. See generally Miriam Galston, Rawlsian Dualism and the Autonomy of Polit-
ical Thought, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1842, 1845 (1994) (suggesting the existance of a con-
flict between Rawls's political theories and some comprehensive theories). For
example, Rawls argues that one of the fundamental principles of "political liberalism"
is the "idea of citizens... as free and equal persons." Rawls, supra note 7, at 14. This
idea is not altogether obvious from the perspective of all comprehensive doctrines. In
Islamic law, for instance, Christians and Jews living within the jurisdiction of an Is-
lamic government have historically been accorded a social status different from, and
likely inferior to, their fellow Muslim residents.
Jews and Christians ruled by Muslims had the political status of dhimmis,
being accorded toleration in return for submitting to Muslim rule and ac-
cepting a number of conditions governing their conduct. Dhimmis had to
pay a special capitation tax known as the jizya and were excluded from serv-
ing in the military .... Depending on the jurists' opinions, dhimmis could be
either excluded from serving in government altogether or excluded from
high government positions.
Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics 127 (2d ed.
1995) (footnote omitted); see also Abdur Rahman I. Doi, Shari'ah: The Islamic Law
426-36 (1984) (discussing aspects of Islamic legal discourses generally); Majid Khad-
duri, The Islamic Conception of Justice 163 (1984) (describing regulation of Muslim
and non-Muslim relations). While it is not clear whether the use of dhimmi status is a
transcendent principle required to implement an Islamic system of government in all
times and places, its historical existence calls into question whether Islam could be a
"reasonable comprehensive doctrine" within Rawls's political liberal vision of society.
But see Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liber-
ties, Human Rights, and International Law 91 (1990) (suggesting that dhimmi status
may not be a necessary element to an Islamic governmental system). Most impor-
tantly, though, it suggests that Rawls's fundamental principle of the equality and free-




good and bad,'" or in Rawls's terms "reasonable" and
"unreasonable."' 9
For example, in a Rawlsian pluralist society, certain comprehensive
doctrines cannot be included in the political consensus reached in
matters of fundamental constitutional concern. Rawls calls this con-
sensus an "overlapping consensus"-overlapping because it contains
the intersection of "reasonable comprehensive doctrines" over certain
principles underlying the political liberalist venture. 2 ' Comprehensive
doctrines are reasonable only to the extent that they accept the polit-
ical liberal ideals of justice.21 These ideals outweigh competing ideals
proffered by other comprehensive doctrines. The values which "con-
flict with the political conception of justice and its sustaining virtues
may be normally outweighed because they come into conflict with the
very conditions that make fair social cooperation possible on a footing
of mutual respect."'  As a moral force, the political conception of
justice determines what is reasonable and unreasonable. "Political lib-
eralism" and its "sustaining values" are essentially metaphysical ideals
which are actualized, in part, through the determination of certain
18. Galston argues this point expressly. She states:
[A] person's understanding of the relationship between his moral, religious,
philosophic, or other comprehensive views and political values and objec-
tives is itself an important part of the person's comprehensive views. As a
consequence, Rawls's admission that his political theory may take a position
on this question that conflicts with the counterpart understanding of this
question contained in the person's comprehensive view reveals the existence
of a more fundamental conflict between Rawls's political theory and some
comprehensive theories than is apparent from his earlier assurances.
GaIston, supra note 17, at 1845. Sandel notes that some commentators do not agree
with this position. "Some have read Rawls's recent writings as suggesting that justice
as fairness, being a political conception of justice, requires no moral or philosophical
justification apart from an appeal to the shared understandings implicit in our polit-
ical culture." Sandel, supra note 13, at 1774. But see Abner S. Greene, Uncommon
Ground, 62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 646, 649-50 (1994) (book review) (suggesting that
"although Rawls claims to advance an argument sounding in political liberalism, his
views are actually more consistent with the comprehensive liberalism that he claims to
avoid").
19. See, eg., Rawls, supra note 7, at 48-50 (defining reasonable people by their
desire to cooperate with others on mutually agreeable terms).
20. For example, Rawls writes that his political conception of justice is the "focus
of an overlapping consensus of at least the reasonable comprehensive doctrines af-
firmed by its citizens." Id at 48.
21. Reasonable comprehensive doctrines can accommodate the language of polit-
ical liberalism in the context of reciprocal relations between free and equal persons.
And yet the language and requirements of political liberalism limit which comprehen-
sive doctrines can reasonably be respected within a political liberal regime.
[R]easonable persons see that the burdens of judgment set limits on what
can be reasonably justified to others, and so they endorse some form of lib-
erty of conscience and freedom of thought. It is unreasonable for us to use
political power, should we possess it, or share it with others, to repress com-
prehensive views that are not unreasonable.
Id at 61.
22. Id. at 157.
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comprehensive doctrines as reasonable and others as unreasonable.23
Consequently, the "overlapping consensus" required in a pluralist so-
ciety is more than simply a modus vivendi premised upon special
group interests. It is a moral consensus of a political conception of
justice that is itself moral.24 Rawls's theory of justice "is not merely a
... pragmatic or superficial acceptance of the political community's
values and goals. Rawls's theory requires that citizens believe in co-
operation as a positive social good and not just as necessary to ensure
their private pursuit of ends without fear or interference. '
If "political liberalism" is a comprehensive doctrine, then what is
public reason if not the language and method of actualizing the princi-
ples of "political liberalism" in reality. Public reason becomes the vo-
cabulary of the discourse concerning the overlapping consensus on
issues of political relevance.26 In it are the "principles of reasoning
and rules of evidence in the light of which citizens are to decide
whether substantive principles properly apply and to identify laws and
policies that best satisfy them."'27 Public reason is "an intellectual and
moral power" by which a political society puts its ends "in an order of
priority" and makes its decisions accordingly.28 As a mechanism of
communication and order, it is intimately tied to "the ideals and prin-
ciples expressed by society's conception of political justice ...."
The ideals of "political liberalism" require a system of thought, ex-
pression, and language. Public reason fulfills all of these necessary
functions. "What public reason asks is that citizens be able to explain
23. The nature of reasonability suggests that "political liberalism" incorporates
certain metaphysical principles of social organization which vitiate its purely political
nature. For example, Rawls suggests a definition of one such principle: "This or-
ganizing idea is that of society as a fair system of social cooperation between free and
equal persons viewed as fully cooperating members of society over a complete life."
Id. at 9. Such a principle provides "a publicly recognized point of view from which all
citizens can examine before one another whether their political and social institutions
are just." Id. The principles provide a public point of view from which the political
conception of justice can be examined. But the standard of judgment is set already by
the principles themselves. Justice is examined by a public political perspective which
not only was established by certain principles, but also maintains and entrenches
those principles in the hearts of the society's citizens. The construction of meaning
and justice therefore assumes a certain circularity in its form.
24. Id. at 147.
25. Galston, supra note 17, at 1850 (footnotes omitted).
26. See Sandel, supra note 13, at 1789 ("Not only may government not endorse
one or another conception of the good, but citizens may not even introduce into polit-
ical discourse their comprehensive moral or religious convictions, at least when debat-
ing matters of justice and rights." (emphasis added)); see also Elizabeth H. Wolgast,
The Demands of Public Reason, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1936, 1937 (1994) ("Public reason
concerns the citizens' public discussion of publicly important issues for the
community.").
27. Rawls, supra note 7, at 224.
28. Id. at 212-13.
29. Id. at 213; see also id. at 223 (noting that public reason "is elaborated in terms




their vote to one another in terms of a reasonable balance of public
political values .... "30 Public reason sets the terms of debate in rela-
tion to the underlying principles of "political liberalism."
For lawyers, the language of our profession is part of the public rea-
son of "political liberalism." Our discourse on matters of rights, con-
stitutional values, and fair treatment of individuals as equal and free
incorporates the principles of a pluralist democratic society. Conse-
quently, the law is intimately involved in the convictional system of
"political liberalism." It is one of the means by which the ideals and
beliefs of "political liberalism" are actualized in reality in the form of
rules, such as legislative acts, court cases, and ethical codes of conduct.
These codifications of justice establish for lawyers the language of our
profession and the guidelines of our behavior.' In a sense, they are
the "dogma" and "doctrine" of our faith as attorneys within a compre-
hensive doctrine of "political liberalism."
If the law is an instrument in a comprehensive doctrine of a political
conception of justice, the religious lawyer is faced with negotiating a
reality between two different convictional systems both of which he
adopts. My idea of "negotiation" is analogous to, but significantly dif-
ferent from, Professor Griffin's use of "translate."3 For Professor
Griffin, the religious attorney must "translate" his or her religious be-
liefs in a manner comprehensible and respected by the public reason
of "political liberalism."33 This translation process, though, is a one
way process, which seems to reaffirm the private nature of religion
and the public nature of law inherent in the dualism of "political liber-
alism." It can be agreed that the religious attorney views his reality
from two different perspectives-the professional and the religious.
His behavior is necessarily composed of a complex reciprocal interac-
30. Id. at 243 (emphasis added).
31. This raises the question whether and how lawyers are different from other
citizens of a pluralist, democratic society. In other words, are lawyers the only ones
who can be members of a society steeped in respect for the equality and freedom of
the individual? The obvious answer to this question is a resounding "no." The lan-
guage of the legal profession only constitutes one type of language in the vocabulary
of public reason. In the United States, for example, both lawyers and citizens take
oaths of loyalty to the law. The difference is that lawyers are in a unique position to
explain the rights and obligations to non-lawyer citizens. In a sense, they play a simi-
lar function as the fuquha' (lawyers) and inujtahids (jurists) played in Islamic history.
These functionaries informed Muslims of their duties under Islamic law and to the
Divine Will. They were not part of a clergy;, rather they were judges, law teachers, or
legal professionals (in a loose sense) who guided individuals on their path to the Di-
vine Will. See generally George Makdisi, The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learn-
ing in Islam and the West (1981) (discussing Islamic institutions of learning and the
hierarchy of the Islamic legal "profession"). In a similar manner, lawyers guide citi-
zens on a path toward experiencing their equality and freedom within a politically
liberal society. In fact, it may be this very function which prompts Luban to remark:
"[O]ur nation is so dependent on its lawyers that their ethical problems transform
themselves into public difficulties." Luban, supra note 3, at xviii.




tion between these two systems of "belief." To require him or her to
translate one system into the terms of the other without requiring the
reverse undermines the integrity of the first system as an equally valid
epistemological system. The idea of a one-way translation reaffirms
the exclusion of religion from public, and even legal, discourse.34 Fur-
thermore, because "political liberalism" is a comprehensive doctrine
enjoying a degree of power not experienced by other comprehensive
doctrines, any translation of a comprehensive doctrine into terms fa-
miliar to "political liberalism" may threaten the integrity of the origi-
nal doctrine. This is not to say that public discourse should make
room for religious vocabulary and extensive religious symbolism;
rather the norms and "dogma" of the legal profession must also be
open to the possibility of being "translated" into terms familiar to the
"public reason" of a religious system. This reciprocal translation is
what I mean by "negotiate." "Negotiation" implies an equal relation-
ship and respect for both systems of belief that the religious attorney
adopts.35 It acknowledges the complexity of the religious attorney's
character and personality, and enables him to determine his behav-
ioral reality in a holistic fashion. 36
Consequently, I agree with Professor Griffin that where the attor-
ney violates a legal obligation and opts to follow his religious duties
instead, he should be treated by the legal system as a conscientious
objector, as opposed to being exempted in a fashion analogous to ex-
emptions under Free Exercise jurisprudence. As Professor Griffin
34. Although the religious impetus may still exist once its terms have been trans-
lated into those of the law, the point is that the standard of judging the "reasonabil-
ity" of the religious assertion is invested in another system of thought. Religious
belief is not given the opportunity to apply its language and public reason to the task
of determining the appropriate ethical behavior of the religious attorney. By requir-
ing a reciprocal translation, religious belief is given this opportunity and is acknowl-
edged as equally valid in both the private and public realms of personal conduct.
35. The mechanism of any "negotiation" process is a complex matter beyond the
scope of this paper. For purposes of this paper, the use of "negotiation" in contrast to
"translate" is meant to carry psychological weight for the religious legal professional.
"Translation," as a one way process, does not seem to respect the integrity of a reli-
gious system vis-A-vis political liberalism in the same way that "negotiation" does.
Nevertheless, the concept of "negotiation" is the heart of any process a religious legal
professional uses to reconcile his or her religious beliefs with the law and its ethical
requirements. How this negotiation process occurs will likely differ depending on
who is doing the negotiation and what the consequences are for the overlapping con-
sensus implicit in any political system. An attorney facing an ethical-religious conflict
will have a negotiation process quite different from a judge who faces a religious con-
flict concerning the legal outcome of a case. Both will engage in discourse between
the two systems, subject to varying constraints imposed by the political philosophy of
the prevailing system of law. What those constraints are and how they apply at differ-
ent levels of the legal and political process is a subject requiring further necessary
discussion.
36. For example, the freedom and equality of the individual implicit in a politically
liberal society must be translated into terms that resonate with Islamic conceptions of




notes, an exemption model excuses the religious believer from disci-
plinary proceedings; whereas, in a civil disobedience model, the pen-
alty is not suspended.37 The civil disobedient attorney follows his
beliefs and accepts the penalty imposed upon him by his respective
bar's disciplinary committee.38 Professor Griffin argues, and I think
correctly so, that, if an exemption model were used, the legal profes-
sion would appear to grant greater importance to an attorney's belief
than the professional standards it sets forth.39 I would argue that the
equality of both doctrines, which is implicit in the negotiation process,
would be undermined under an exemption model. The attorney takes
an oath to uphold the laws of the state(s) in which he or she practices,
just as the attorney may have taken an oath in a particular religious
tradition to follow its tenets and adhere to its religious rulings.40 To
grant the religious attorney an excuse for following his religion and
violating his profession's ethical requirements denigrates the value of
the legal system and the value of the attorney's oath to it. By preserv-
ing the punitive element arising from an attorney's disobedience, the
law and its comprehensive doctrine is respected as a holistic doctrine.
Therefore, where there is a conflict between an attorney's professional
and religious obligations, the attorney's resolution will likely lead to
punishment in one system of belief or the other. Whether the attor-
ney wishes the sanction to occur in this life or the next is a matter of
personal choice relating to moral attitude and accountability.41
Professor Griffin goes beyond the case of the religious attorney who
attempts to reconcile the law with his or her faith and inquires
whether and how legal ethics can be informed by religious ethics.42
37. Griffin, supra note 1, at 1259-60.
38. Id
39. Id at 1260-61.
40. The Muslim, for example, is generally considered a member of the Muslim
ummah (community) once he or she states the Declaration of Faith, or shahadah:
"There is no god but Allah and Muhammad is His Messenger." Once the shahadah is
recited, the individual obligates himself or herself to the dictates of the faith. In a
similar fashion, when I took the attorney's oath to be admitted to the State Bar of
California, I swore to uphold the Constitution, the laws of the United States, and the
laws of the State of California. How or why should these two oaths be different in
quality and import from each other? Both invoke moral systems of ethical and social
order. Both impose upon the oath-taker certain obligations and duties once the oath
is taken. They serve the same function with their respective subject matter.
41. The private ethical problems of lawyers become public difficulties the more
we, as a society, depend upon lawyers. Luban, supra note 3, at xviii. Consequently,
the more we wish to allow different systems of belief to enter into the ethical equa-
tion, the more we open the door of public discourse to what are considered private
matters of belief. Griffin's argument opens the door only a crack, presumably, to
restrain the attorney from infusing the public discourse with religious doctrines that
may undermine the respect for pluralism inherent in "political liberalism" and the
law. Alternatively, my position opens the door farther, on the assumption that the
lawyer can be trusted to differentiate between his two systems of belief and respect
their separateness.
42. Griffin, supra note 1, at 1275-76.
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Her major concern is that the terms of the debate may not be equally
accessible to all members of the profession. The use of theological
terms unique to Islam, for example, may not appeal to Jewish, Catho-
lic, or Buddhist attorneys. Once again, Professor Griffin requires a
translation of religious belief into terms familiar to the public reason
of "political liberalism." The religious lawyer must make his religious
beliefs "fit" the requirements of legal practice; otherwise he must rec-
oncile the conflict in favor of one system over the other, or possibly
opt out of one system or the other.
For Professor Griffin, affecting legal ethics through the translation
of religious beliefs into the vocabulary of public reason is best done by
the secular humanist discipline of religious studies.43 Distinguishing
religious studies from theology, she argues that, "[i]n the twentieth
century, religious studies found its way in the 'secular academy,' while
theology often remained in the seminaries."'4 4 Theology presumes be-
lief whereas religious studies considers belief largely irrelevant.45
Scholars of religion "have searched for a study of religion that does
not presuppose faith or belief in God., 46 To the extent religious stud-
ies is secular in nature, it shares common features with the law and is
therefore in a better position to translate theological beliefs into pub-
lic reason.
If utilitarianism and Kantianism, consequentialism and deontology,
are becoming standard ethical terms for lawyers, then lawyers
should learn that the religious ethical traditions are also comprehen-
sible, not merely personal or private accounts of morality. Religion
is public; secular religious studies easily meets the requirements of
public reason and the secular curriculum. 47
I disagree with Professor Griffin's argument in that I do not assume
that the secular humanist endeavor of religious studies is neutral and
non-commital; rather it is part of its own comprehensive doctrine.
Like the law, religious studies does not necessarily adopt or establish a
specific belief system. By its very existence, however, it connotes the
establishment of the comprehensive doctrine of secular humanism
that, like "political liberalism," creates a dualistic reality relegating
matters of religion to the private realm and matters of law, or in this
43. Griffin, supra note 1, at 1268.
44. Id. 1268-69.
45. It is unclear whether the belief Griffin refers to in this section is that of the
believer being studied or the believer who studies his religion. The significance of this
difference will be addressed below. See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
46. Griffin, supra note 1, at 1269. Griffin also recognizes that not all religious
scholars insist on this presupposition. Quoting Mircea Eliade, Griffin notes: "I do
not mean to deny the usefulness of approaching the religious phenomenon from vari-
ous different angles; but it must be looked at first of all in itself, in that which belongs
to it alone and can be explained in no other terms." Id. at 1270 n.48 (quoting Mircea
Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion xiii (Rosemary Sheed trans., Meridian
Books 1984)).
47. Griffin, supra note 1, at 1271-72.
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case academics, to the public realm.' In a secular humanist sense,
religious belief is not understood "reductively as a psychologically or
culturally determined belief in nonexistent realities, or explained away
as an accident of biology, but is recognized as a fndamental human
activity in which every society and individual symbolically interprets
and engages the ultimate nature of being."49 Religious studies em-
ploys a materialist conception of reality which has little room for God
or metaphysical notions of morality.5" And yet its materialist princi-
ple is what makes it part of a larger comprehensive doctrine, distinct
from religious comprehensive doctrines. Like law, religious studies
becomes part of the language of the public reason of secular human-
ism, just as the Shari'a is part of the "public reason" of Islam,51 or the
Halakha is part of the "public reason" of the Jewish faith,52 or the
48. It is not clear whether this comprehensive doctrine might be "political liber-
alism" itself. To the extent that the law and religious studies presume a secular soci-
ety, both seem to be a part of the same doctrine and employ similar vocabulary.
Rawls is not entirely clear how his theory of "political liberalism" relates to secular
humanist thought. He states:
Sometimes one hears reference made to the so-called Enlightenment project
of finding a philosophical secular doctrine, one founded on reason and yet
comprehensive.
... Whether there is or ever was such an Enlightenment project we need
not consider, for in any case political liberalism, as I think of it, and justice as
fairness as a form thereof, has no such ambitions.
Rawls, supra note 7, at xx. But if "political liberalism" is comprehensive, is it part of a
larger secular-humanist tradition, or are the two different? Rawls does not discuss the
matter because he asserts that "political liberalism" is not comprehensive. Therefore,
we do not yet have an answer to this question.
49. Richard Tarnas, The Passion of the Western Mind 404 (1991) (emphasis
added).
50. For example, Machiavelli notes that religion is "essential for the maintenance
of a civilized way of life." Niccolo Machiavelli, The Discourses, in Selected Political
Writings 114 (David Wootton ed. & trans., Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 1994).
His concern with religion was not with its tenets or beliefs, but rather with its effects
on the organization of society. Consequently, the study of religion is immersed within
a materialist endeavor of understanding humanity and its process of change, rather
than understanding the Will of God, as was the case with Middle Age writers such as
St. Augustine in The City of God. St. Augustine, The City of God (F.R. Montogmery
Hitchcock trans., The MacMillan Company 1943).
51. See generally Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Authoritative and Authoritarian in
Islamic Discourses: A Contemporary Case Study (Dar Taiba 2d ed. 1997) (providing
standards of Islamic legal discourse and a methodology for hadith analysis); Muham-
mad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (rev. ed. 1991) (addressing
classical legal analysis and epistemology); Khaled Abou El Fadl, Muslim Minorities
and Self Restraint in Liberal Denocracies, 29 Loy. L.A. L Rev. 1525, 1526-28 (1996)
(suggesting methods of discourse among Muslims living as minorities in liberal
democracies).
52. See generally Elliot N. Dorff & Arthur Rosett, A Living Tree: The Roots and
Growth of Jewish Law (1988) (discussing aspects of Jewish Law generally); David
Novak, Natural Law, Halakhah, and the Covenant, in Contemporary Jewish Ethics




Canons are part of the "public reason" in the Catholic faith.53 All of
these regulatory systems of behavior have their own language, terms,
methods, and importantly, underlying metaphysical principles of mo-
rality, whether it be academic standards of excellence or God's word.
Once religious studies is understood to be part of a larger compre-
hensive secular doctrine, then how a religious convictional system can
inform the law through religious studies is different from what Profes-
sor Griffin suggests, especially if we are concerned with responsibly
negotiating between multiple convictional systems.54 Here I do not
distinguish "religion" from "theology" as Professor Griffin does. Pro-
fessor Griffin's dichotomy allows for academicians of one religious
persuasion to comment upon issues of moral significance in another.55
In the book Hagarism, for example, the authors attempt to use non-
Islamic sources to track the origins of the Islamic faith. What they
propose is a reconstruction of a well-accepted historical account. The
following quote, taken from the preface of the book, illustrates my
concern when academicians in religious studies attempt to comment
upon matters of a religion not their own.
In the first place, the account we have given of the origins of Is-
lam is not one which any believing Muslim can accept: not because
it in any way belittles the historical role of Muhammad, but because
it presents him in a role quite different from that which he has taken
53. Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal
Tradition 199 (1983) (discussing the development of Canon law and its relation to the
Church).
54. Even if we adopt religious studies as the mechanism by which we inform the
law and legal ethics of theological positions, it is not altogether clear what Professor
Griffin means by "religious studies" or what religious studies includes. The first prob-
lem is with defining religious studies. A cursory review of religious studies programs
across the country would reveal an unsystematic curriculum. For example, whether
Islamic studies is present in a religious studies department, an Arabic department, or
an Asian Studies department is not at all predictable, despite the fact that such a
program addresses matters of Islamic theology. Second, even if we use religious stud-
ies as a method of translating theological beliefs into terms familiar to the law, the
problem we will face is whether religious studies sufficiently includes diverse theologi-
cal perspectives. Whether the theological perspective can enter the realm of secular
humanist academia is often dependent upon whether certain religions are sufficiently
empowered in society to be allowed into the university setting. Such inclusion may be
possible for religions such as Christianity and Judaism; it is not uncommon to find
rabbis and priests teaching courses on college campuses. But for other less empow-
ered faiths, it is not clear whether they will be permitted into the realm of religious
studies. Religious studies reflects the normal power structures of society. It has its
own interests which often parallel dominant political views. Inherently defective as
an objective mechanism of theological representation, religious studies cannot suffi-
ciently ensure adequate and objective representation of diverse theological
viewpoints.
55. Professor Griffin notes that there is an issue regarding whether religion schol-
ars can comment on religious traditions not their own. Griffin, supra note 1, at 1277.
Nevertheless, she allows for this to occur by relying on an inherently secular religious




on in the Islamic tradition.... Our account is not merely unaccept-
able; it is also one which any Muslim whose faith is as a grain of
mustard seed should find no difficulty in rejecting.56
While secular humanist academic standards may find little problem
with this type of endeavor, what is the effect of this type of scholarship
in light of Professor Griffin's proposal that religious studies be a
mechanism by which religious belief can be translated into terms fa-
miliar to the law? If the same quote appeared in a work by a non-
Muslim professor of Islamic law on a matter of legal and theological
concern to Muslims, what would be the value of such research in
terms of reconciling a Muslim attorney's religious and professional ob-
ligations? This problem arises because, in religious studies, not only
does the belief of the believer being studied not matter, but neither
does the belief of the one doing the research.
Under my theory, the legitimacy granted to a scholar of a religious
tradition not his own should be diminished when he addresses matters
in the realm of moral and ethical duty. If we assume that political
liberalism, secular humanism, and religious belief constitute different
comprehensive doctrines with their own language and requirements
for their respective "public reasons," how can someone who does not
adopt a particular comprehensive religious doctrine legitimately nego-
tiate a reality between that faith and the law? The legal academician
within the secular humanist tradition will use the terms and standards
of his or her tradition, namely secular humanist religious studies, as
opposed to the terms and standards of the faith in question to commu-
nicate with the legal tradition of "political liberalism." If this aspect of
Professor Griffin's proposal incorporates a desire to ensure the moral
accountability of legal practitioners, how can we allow scholars with
one religious persuasion to provide what is essentially moral guidance
to believers of another religion? How can we overlook the fact that a
scholar who researches matters of moral and ethical duty within a
comprehensive doctrine not his own cannot be held morally accounta-
ble with respect to the doctrine studied? It seems to be counter-
productive to the idea of moral accountability to allow a religious
studies academic to be a moral guide to a doctrine's followers when he
is a foreigner to the doctrine itself.
This is not to say that religious scholars can never comment on reli-
gious traditions not their own. Rather, what I am saying is that such
scholars cannot assume the same type of legitimacy in their scholar-
ship when issues of morality and ethical duty are involved as a reli-
gious scholar who is also a believer of the faith he or she studies. For
example, the principle academic resource in the legal profession is the
law review. Is it surprising that most authors in law reviews across the




country are in some manner affiliated with the legal profession as
either law students, law professors, practitioners, or judges? Where
the law is part of a comprehensive doctrine, the ones who hold the
greatest legitimacy for elaborating its principles and doctrines are the
followers of the doctrine who can "speak" its "language." If I want to
understand the constitutionality of a particular tax provision, I will
want to read an article by an attorney well versed in the fields of con-
stitutional and tax law. I will not likely go to a certified public ac-
countant or a moral philosopher. This is not to say that these
professionals have nothing to contribute to the law; rather, their rele-
vance is severely curtailed by their inexperience and lack of training in
the law. My "beliefs" as an attorney are rooted in a system of thought
that has a logic all its own.
Why should this be different for the religious scholar who tries to
reconcile ethical duties between the law and a religious system?
Where moral guidance is being addressed, how can we assume that
someone who is not morally accountable to a particular religious com-
prehensive doctrine can legitimately negotiate between that system's
language and the language of the law? When it comes to matters of
morality and belief, as well as negotiating an existence between com-
peting systems of belief and loyalty, a greater amount of legitimacy
should be granted to one who is himself morally accountable to the
competing systems on which he comments. 57
In conclusion, the means by which one negotiates between two ethi-
cal comprehensive doctrines will differ with respect to those doctrines
and their respective vocabularies. Furthermore, whether a negotia-
tion is possible will depend on the flexibility of each doctrine and the
versatility of its mechanism of public reason. To determine the intri-
cacies of how such a negotiation will take place is a matter beyond the
scope of this paper. My principle purpose is to proffer the paradigm
of "negotiation" over "translation" as a means by which a religious
lawyer can holistically consider and determine his normative reality
without subjugating any system of thought and belief to another.
While, as attorneys, we live in a politically liberal society and adopt its
norms and principles, many of us also adopt normative religious prin-
ciples, which also govern our conduct. As religious attorneys, we have
accepted both systems of thought into our life. We are equally obli-
gated to both. Consequently, we must consciously and continuously
57. A consequence of my proposal is that anyone wishing to engage in academic
debate about a conflict between a religious and legal obligation will essentially have to
be an "adherent" of all three fields, namely law, religion, and the academic discipline
of his choice-each of which is part of its own comprehensive doctrine. Conse-
quently, the religious legal academician will be forced to negotiate a reality between
the three doctrines he adopts. It is this negotiation which constitutes the basis of his
legitimacy and accountability.
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accommodate the needs of both systems while pushing each to their
greatest flexibility in order to nourish the needs of the other.
Notes & Observations
